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a b s t r a c t
Anti-spooﬁng is attracting growing interest in biometrics, considering the variety of fake materials and
newmeans to attack biometric recognition systems. New unseen materials continuously challenge state-
of-the-art spooﬁng detectors, suggesting for additional systematic approaches to target anti-spooﬁng. By
incorporating liveness scores into the biometric fusion process, recognition accuracy can be enhanced,
but traditional sum-rule based fusion algorithms are known to be highly sensitive to single spoofed
instances. This paper investigates 1-median ﬁltering as a spooﬁng-resistant generalised alternative to
the sum-rule targeting the problem of partial multibiometric spooﬁng where m out of n biometric
sources to be combined are attacked. Augmenting previous work, this paper investigates the dynamic
detection and rejection of liveness-recognition pair outliers for spoofed samples in true multi-modal
conﬁguration with its inherent challenge of normalisation. As a further contribution, bootstrap
aggregating (bagging) classiﬁers for ﬁngerprint spoof-detection algorithm is presented. Experiments
on the latest face video databases (Idiap Replay-Attack Database and CASIA Face Anti-Spooﬁng Database)
and ﬁngerprint spooﬁng database (Fingerprint Liveness Detection Competition 2013) illustrate the
efﬁciency of proposed techniques.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Fingerprint and face biometrics as most widely adopted traits are
being exposed to an increasing threat of presentation attacks. Conse-
quently, there are numerous studies [1,2] and open challenges [3,4] on
anti-spooﬁng techniques assessing the spooﬁng detector's ability to
distinguish between genuine and fake attempts for especially these
two traits. Recently, the integration of anti-spooﬁng scores with
recognition scores has received considerable attention [5–7]. The
standard approach, as outlined in [5], has been to reject spoofed
samples before comparing them against the gallery template. However,
recognition scores can be helpful in the probe-attack spooﬁng detec-
tion problem and liveness scores can impact on the recognition task.
Considering imposters with access to fake ﬁngers or face photographs
reveals an impact on overall accuracy (shifted imposter score distribu-
tion for non-zero-effort attempts [7]) and assuming a correlation
between successful spoofs achieving a higher score and their corre-
sponding liveness score is likely (and shown) to help in the ﬁnal
judgment of the decision task, especially in an ensemble of classiﬁers
where this paper looks for outliers. It is therefore useful to investigate
the beneﬁts of dealing with a holistic (liveness and veriﬁcation) multi-
class problem rather than two separate classiﬁcation problems (live vs.
fake and genuine vs. impostor). If a system involves multiple modalities
there is an even larger variety of different ways to treat the problem of
combining liveness and recognition scores. Multibiometrics using face
and ﬁngerprint biometrics comes with many beneﬁts including
expected increased accuracy, higher universality (absence of single
characteristics), efﬁciency (fast indexing), but its robustness to spooﬁng
attempts has been shown to be compromised [8,9]. Furthermore, with
the inclusion of multiple modalities the attacker has an even more
extended choice to select the easiest modality to be attacked. It is
therefore desirable to ﬁnd new techniques coping with spooﬁng
attacks, which are subject to investigation in this paper. The paper
focuses on three objectives: (1) investigation of spooﬁng robustness in
multibiometrics; (2) development of novel methods towards anomaly
detection for increased systematic anti-spooﬁng; and (3) proposition of
a novel bootstrap aggregating (bagging) of classiﬁers method combin-
ing features in ﬁngerprint counter-spooﬁng.
With regard to the ﬁrst topic on spooﬁng robustness in multi-
biometrics, the paper tests degradation in accuracy for the “partial
multibiometric spooﬁng” scenario, where m out of n samples are
spoofed, highlighting the tradeoff between accuracy and security
for different fusion methods. Fig. 1 illustrates this concept. The
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sensitivity of a recognition and liveness fusion method with regard
to spooﬁng is especially interesting in multimodal conﬁguration,
where scores originate from different underlying distributions and
multiple traits facilitate a selection of the modality to be attacked.
The paper analyses the impact of the number of spoofed ﬁngers or
spoofed face on accuracy using the latest biometric datasets. The
relative robustness of several score-level fusion rules can be used to
choose the most robust fusion rule [9].
As a second outlined contribution, this paper presents a novel
multibiometric spooﬁng-aware fusion method following the idea of
anomaly detection and extending research in [10] to multiple mod-
alities. This paper investigates 1-median-based fusion using outlier
detection applied in a multibiometric setup. Note that the extension to
multiple modalities raises further questions with regard to normal-
isation. For different modalities, scores generally follow different
distributions. Therefore, counter-spooﬁng is much more challenging
than for single-modality approaches, including multi-instance or
multi-algorithm approaches. Further, this work presents further the-
oretical considerations and discusses parameter choice in detail.
Recognition scores and liveness scores are likely to be dependent, as
spooﬁng tries to achieve a high recognition score in order to success-
fully claim the alien (spoofed) identity. In partial multibiometric
spooﬁng this information can be used to further discriminate between
genuines and impostors. Despite spooﬁng sensitivity of traditional
fusion techniques, it is a reasonable assumption to claim a higher
difﬁculty for attackers to spoof multiple modalities at the same time or
even to obtain the necessary samples to produce a fake ﬁngerprint or
face mask. On the other hand, special spooﬁng-robust fusion schemes
might exhibit a reduced level of accuracy. This trade-off between cost
and security to limit drawbacks [5,11] is investigated.
Third and last, as a by-product of evaluations the paper further
presents a novel spooﬁng detector again employing a fusion principle:
bootstrap aggregating (bagging) of classiﬁers. This technique is
employed in combining the decision outcome of multiple different
classiﬁers. Using also multiple features to be more robust vs. changes
in materials (see [12]), the paper aims at investigating this technique
in the employed system as an anti-ﬁngerprint spooﬁng technique
towards integral fusion concepts in robust anti-spooﬁng. Bagging is
shown to outperform state-of-the-art detectors on the most challen-
ging LivDet 2013 Crossmatch subset database.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2
introduces the problems of anti-spooﬁng and spooﬁng-aware fusion
in biometrics. The proposed methods of bagging for spoof-detection
and 1-median ﬁltering for spooﬁng-resistant multibiometric fusion
are outlined in Section 3. Section 4 highlights experimental results
with regard to the proposed and investigated techniques. This
includes a discussion of methods towards anomaly detection in
multibiometrics, highlighting parameter choice and optimisation for
the proposed 1-median ﬁltering. Section 5 concludes this paper with
an outlook on future work.
2. Related work
There are several anti-spooﬁng or liveness detection algorithms
extracting features (usually trained for modality, sensor, material,
etc.), in order to determine whether a biometric sample is either live
or fake. For evaluation purposes, ferrlive (rate of misclassiﬁed live
samples) and ferrfake (rate of misclassiﬁed fake samples) are
employed. Whereas for individual modalities the anti-spooﬁng pro-
blem is well deﬁned and evaluated separately from biometric system
performance, research on fusion between match scores and liveness
factors is still in its infancy [13]. Recently, [14] suggested a framework
for veriﬁcation systems under spooﬁng attacks. Within the frame-
work [8] adopted in this paper, liveness and recognition scores are
combined considering the scenario of probe-spooﬁng only (i.e. no
gallery-spooﬁng, enforced by e.g., attended enrolment). Formally,
given a vector of biometric observation (units, e.g. ﬁngers, eyes)
o!¼ ðo1;…onÞ from one or more modalities, and corresponding
claimed identity template g!¼ ðg1;…; gnÞ, the task of the fusion
module F is to compute a uniﬁed decision score, using comparison
scores s!¼ ðs1;…; snÞ and (probe) liveness values l
!¼ ðl1;…; lnÞ, so
that the veriﬁcation task V (authentication based on threshold η) can
be formulated as follows:
Vð o!; g!Þ≔ accept if Fð s
!
; l
!ÞZη;
reject else:
8<
: ð1Þ
Let i be the current index and EðoiÞ; EðgiÞ refer to extracted
(modality-speciﬁc) features of samples, then si ¼ CðEðoiÞ; EðgiÞÞA
½0;1 is used to denote the normalised comparison result of oi; gi
and li ¼ LðoiÞA ½0;1 denote the likeliness of a genuine (live) sample.
Clearly, it is desirable to ﬁnd a method F unaffected in performance
if m out of the n elements of o! are spoofed. This testing setup is
referred to as “partial multibiometric spooﬁng”, introduced in [10]
and extended in this work towards multiple modalities. Note that
this notion of live or spoofed probes vs. always-live enrolled gallery
samples (assuming attended enrollment) leads to a simpler model-
ling (2 classes distinguishing live probe from spoof or live, but
different sources) than in the general asymmetric case (8 classes
based on live/spoof probe, live/spoof gallery sample, and same/
different source) or symmetric case (6 classes) [7], fully concentrat-
ing on a dichotomous authentication task, which can be evaluated
in the traditional way using receiver operating characteristics.
2.1. On combining anti-spooﬁng and recognition
Marasco et al. [5] are among the ﬁrst considering fusion of liveness
with recognition scores separately for each modality, using simple
rejection of spoofed samples. If a spooﬁng attempt is indicated, the
current modalitymatching score is ignored. This initial study is extended
in [15] evaluating sequential fusion, classiﬁer fusion, and Bayesian Belief
Networks for combining match scores and liveness measures, high-
lighting the superiority of the latter method for the LivDet2009 dataset
but also that accuracy is decreased when taking liveness detection into
account. Chingovska et al. [6] evaluate binary decision rules and Logistic
Regression (LR) as decision and score-level fusion techniques combining
face recognition and liveness scores addressing the integration (but
neglecting the partial spooﬁng problem) of liveness. They report higher
resistance to spooﬁng attacks (91.54% vs. 10%) but are outperformed by
Fig. 1. Partial multibiometric spooﬁng of observations oi given templates gi fusing
scores si and liveness values li.
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LR approaches achieving both, high veriﬁcation accuracy and good
spooﬁng detection. Recently, Poh et al. [7] have targeted the problem
of integrating spooﬁng and matching scores in a probe and gallery-
spooﬁng scenario, investigating Gaussian Copula-based Bayesian classi-
ﬁers and a mixture of linear classiﬁers for this task. While their method
outperforms classical Support Vector Machine (SVM) based techniques,
the approach needs training with regards to the full range of attacks.
The assessment of traditional fusion rules (this work is
using Kittler et al.'s classical framework [16]) in the presence
of spooﬁng attacks is a further relevant sub-problem and
addressed in this work. Rodrigues et al. [8,17] ﬁrst addressed
this security issue of spooﬁng attacks against a multimodal
biometric system. They presented two methods, one using
likelihood ratio and another employing fuzzy logic, both
exceeding the accuracy of traditional fusion rules. Also Akhtar
et al. [18] studied the impact of spooﬁng on parallel and serial
fusion rules for face and ﬁngerprint reporting that score-level
fusion methods from the literature are not robust to spooﬁng
attacks and that serial fusion gave better results for an overall
assessment of performance, veriﬁcation time, user acceptabil-
ity and robustness.
2.2. Anti-spooﬁng in ﬁngerprint and face recognition
In ﬁngerprint recognition, there are two general ways to
address the spooﬁng problem: either by actively assessing the
liveness (e.g. by measuring pulse, perspiration patterns, or
blood pressure), or by passively analysing patterns of spoofed
materials (e.g. lack of detail, pattern differences). The latter
type, which is the subject of interest in this paper, reveals high
risk of material and sensor-dependence [12]. An excellent
recent survey of spooﬁng methods in ﬁngerprint recognition
can be found in [2]. Among the most common techniques for
static (extracted from single image) texture-based anti-spoof-
ing methods are statistical features [19], Power Spectrum Four-
ier analysis [20], Ridge Frequency Analysis [19], Local Binary
Patterns (LBP) [21] and Local Phase Quantisation [22]. However,
recent developments towards material-independent static anti-
spooﬁng suggest to combine multiple features and probably
even detectors. Fumera et al. [13] give a good introduction into
the problem of combining multiple liveness detectors for a
single modality, fusion of liveness detector and matcher for a
single modality, and anti-spooﬁng capabilities of ad hoc fusion
rules combining multiple comparison scores.
Face spooﬁng counter-measures can broadly be classiﬁed into
texture-based and motion-based counter-measures. A good over-
view on face counter-spooﬁng may be found in [23]. The ﬁrst
category assessing textural properties is the more widespread
group with approaches like LBP [24], or statistical features [25]
exploiting the observation that images/videos with spoofed faces
(printed or replayed) do not exhibit the same noise-level like
genuine samples. The second type of motion-based approaches
targets the reproduction of (ﬂat) printed photographs or re-display
of faces on tablets exploiting the difference in 3D appearance of
spoofed approaches. For fusion purposes this paper focuses on the
ﬁrst type and employs an existing anti-spooﬁng system [26].
3. Proposed methods
In order to solve the problem of robust face and ﬁngerprint
fusion in the presence of spooﬁng attacks, this work proposes 1-
median ﬁltering for enhanced tolerance with regards to a number
of attack-outliers in the ensemble of score-liveness tuples, and
bagging of classiﬁers for enhanced (fused) spooﬁng resistance.
Both methods are described in detail in the next subsections.
3.1. Score and liveness fusion using 1-median ﬁltering
Aiming to overcome the limitations of traditional sum-rule
based techniques, which are known to be very susceptive towards
outliers and thus easy to be attacked in multibiometric conﬁgura-
tion, where an attacker can target the weakest link in the chain of
combined biometric units to be attacked (e.g. using a particular
available latent ﬁngerprint), 1-median ﬁltering [10] is investigated
as a method for joint face and ﬁngerprint score-and-liveness
fusion. The motivations in the deﬁnition of 1-median ﬁltering
are (1) an extension towards a hybrid between sum rule and
median rule as in Kittler et al.'s classical fusion methods [16] to
ﬁnd an optimal compromise between (0-spoof) accuracy and (m-
spoof) robustness performance; and (2) an incorporation of high-
dimensional information to be combined (score s! and liveness l!
pairs as introduced in Section 2).
Based on the median rule's property to be less affected by
outliers (which is very beneﬁcial for spooﬁng resistance), this
fusion method can be formulated as follows:
Fmf ð s!Þ≔
1Pn
i ¼ 1 Mð s
!
; siÞ
Xn
i ¼ 1
Mð s!; siÞsi: ð2Þ
Mð s!; siÞ≔
1 if simed
n
j ¼ 1
sj

oϕ;
0 else:
8<
: ð3Þ
Note that parameter ϕ limiting the zone of inﬂuence allows for
an arbitrary tradeoff between the sum rule (ϕ¼1 results in
Fmf ð s!Þ¼ 1n
Pn
i ¼ 1 si, the classical sum rule) and the median rule
(for ϕ sufﬁciently small, the deﬁnition becomes Fmf ð s!Þ¼
mednj ¼ 1sj, the median rule). One of the important tasks is to ﬁnd
a suitable (trained) parameter ϕ, which can be either ﬁxed or a
function of the scores. The choice of ϕ is not straightforward and
should rely on the underlying distribution's properties. Parameter
selection is discussed in Section 4.7.
As a motivation for the selection of the median, consider the
following theoretical considerations: as observed in [6] unimodal
non-zero-effort imposter score distributions (comparing a spoofed
sample with a genuine reference) are shifted towards the genuine
distribution (comparing two live genuine samples) compared to
zero-effort imposters (comparing two live samples from different
identities). In an equally weighted mixture-model for random
variables Xi, we have Eð1n
Pn
i ¼ 1 XiÞ ¼ 1n
Pn
i ¼ 1 EðXiÞ ¼ μ assuming
independent, normalised (same mean μ and variance σ2) distribu-
tions. However, for the variance, we get Varð1n
Pn
i ¼ 1 XiÞ ¼
1
n2Varð
Pn
i ¼ 1 XiÞ ¼ 1nσ2. While this illustrates the positive effect of
fusion on imposter scores (narrowing the variance), it also clearly
illustrates that if one of the random variables follows a degraded
spoof-imposter distributionwith lower mean, this is likely leading to
a bimodal distribution (especially if n is large). Assuming the
distributions can be modelled by Gaussians, a mixture of two
normal distributions with highly unequal means has a positive
kurtosis, as the smaller distribution lengthens the tail of the more
dominant one. While there are exceptions to the rule [27], as a rule
of thumb, it is generally suggested, that in skewed distributions, the
mean is farther out the longer tail than the median [28], therefore a
better representative in the ﬁltering process (which is likely to
succeed as can be seen from theoretical considerations if the
number of spoofed modalities is low compared to n). However, note
that the crucial pre-assumption is a proper normalisation, which
ideally should leave genuine score distribution almost unaffected.
Further, note that median ﬁltering is not to be mixed up with image-
or kernel-based combination and works on score (and liveness-)
values to be combined.
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Algorithm 1. Median ﬁltering.
The outlined technique can easily be extended to 2D for combin-
ing points ðsi; liÞ of recognition and liveness scores, using the
geometric-median (1-median). This is the point minimising the sum
of distances to the sample points using score si and liveness li as
coordinate values.
F2mf ð s
!
; l
!Þ≔ 1Pn
i ¼ 1M
s!
l
!
" #
;
si
li
" # !Xn
i ¼ 1
M
s!
l
!
" #
;
si
li
" # !
si
li
" #
: ð4Þ
M
s!
l
!
" #
;
si
li
" # !
≔
1 if
si
li
" #
med
n
j ¼ 1
sj
lj
" #
oϕ;
0 else:
8><
>: ð5Þ
Fig. 2 illustrates how median ﬁltering uses the median as a seed
point to select all points in a local neighbourhood, computing the
centroid of the set of ﬁltered points as an even better local rep-
resentative. As the median is less affected by outliers (left example) it
is beneﬁcial in the presence of outliers, whereas in case samples are
less scattered (right example), no samples are rejected. Algorithm 1
illustrates all the steps. Note that the additional processing time
needed for the comparison should have a negligible impact, as n is
traditionally rather small.
Note that the 1-median is not necessarily an input point and for
performance reasons an approximation (e.g., coordinate-wise med-
ian) might be sufﬁcient. As the task of the fusion module is to come
to a ﬁnal single decision score, a further mapping to a single scalar
is necessary. For this task, LR or SVMs can be employed to ﬁnd the
hyperplane Ψ : w! x! b!¼ 0 optimally separating the sets of
genuine and zero-/m-spoof impostors, where m is the number of
spoofed samples in the joint fusion scheme
Fmf ð s!; l
!Þ≔distðF2mf ð s
!
; l
!Þ;Ψ Þ: ð6Þ
Separability becomes more difﬁcult for larger values of m
(spoofed samples), the presented implementation uses m¼ ⌊n=2c.
Threshold variation is equal to moving the hyperplane separating the
two (genuine and impostor) joint score- and liveness-distributions.
Training of Ψ is discussed in Section 4.5.
3.2. Bagging-based ﬁngerprint liveness detection
For ﬁngerprint anti-spooﬁng relatively poor performance com-
pared to other test sets is reported for the Crossmatch subset of
LivDet 2013 ﬁngerprint database [4]. In order to improve those
results, this paper proposes the following novel spoof detection
algorithm. The employed setup follows a three-stage architecture
with preprocessing, feature extraction, and classiﬁer fusion. Fig. 3
illustrates the processing chain. In the preprocessing stage, the
ﬁngerprint image is segmented and aligned. The background of
the image is removed using Otsu's thresholding [29] and the
region of interest is automatically cropped at a dimension of 248
by 256 pixels. Feature extraction extracts global properties and
local texture details using three methods selected as representa-
tive methods (wavelet-based, statistical and frequency-based) to
make maximal use of the fusion technique:
1. 2D Gabor ﬁlters [30]: These ﬁlters as a product of a Gaussian and
a sinusoid capturing local details are parameterised by Gaussian
space constants δx and δy, frequency f of the modulating sinusoid
and orientation θ
Gðx; y; f Þ ¼ 1
2πδxδy
e1=2ðx
02=δ2x þy02=δ2y Þ cos ð2πfx0Þ
x0 ¼ x sin θþy cos θ y0 ¼ x cos θy sin θ ð7Þ
Similar to [31] θ is set to 01;451;901 and 1351 at frequency f¼0.1,
corresponding to 10 pixels (typical inter ridge distance). The
ﬁltered region of interest is divided in blocks of 2020 pixels.
For each block, mean and standard deviation are computed
leading to a total of 880 features.
2. Gray level co-occurrence matrix (GLCM): 6 features each were
extracted from 20 by 20 sized pixel-blocks (leading to a total
feature vector size of 1100 components) computing local
characteristics following [31]: maximum probability, entropy,
contrast, energy, homogeneity and inverse difference moment
of order k.
3. Fourier Transform (FT) based features: As global features on the
Fourier-transformed image, the sum of absolute differences
between pairs of concentric circles (at distance 1–3 pixels,
evaluated at 25 locations) are computed, similar to [32],
yielding 180 components.
Fig. 2. 1-Median ﬁltering vs. sum-rule in 2D with outliers (left) and without (right). Fig. 3. Proposed ﬁngerprint counter-spooﬁng based on bagging classiﬁers.
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The ﬁnal feature of 2160 components is obtained by concatenat-
ing the 3 individual feature vectors described above and Principal
Component Analysis (PCA) is applied as a feature selection procedure
retaining 99% of the variance of the data with 80 PCA components.
Besides a fusion of features, the suggested anti-spooﬁng algorithm
employs a multiple classiﬁer framework, which distinguishes itself
from a standard multiple classiﬁer system by applying a bagging [33]
technique for its component (base) classiﬁers.
The Bootstrap AGGregatING (bagging) method [33] is used to
add base classiﬁers to the base ensemble using bootstrap replicates
on the training set. The bootstrap method facilitates determining
the probability distribution of the data without using the Central
Limit Theorem [34]. The idea behind bootstrap sampling is to create
an artiﬁcial random list of the labelled training set by picking some
labels more than once. One classiﬁer is trained on this random list
and is added to the base ensemble. In the operational phase, the
base classiﬁers are applied to the input feature and their outputs are
combined at the decision level by using majority vote. To beneﬁt
from the variations of the training set, it is better if the base
classiﬁers are unstable (e.g. neural networks and tree classiﬁers). In
the present work, three base classiﬁers are employed: (1) regu-
larised LR; (2) single layer perceptron, and; (3) SVM. The three base
classiﬁers are trained n¼100 times on different bootstrap replicates
of the training data. In the operational phase, the 300 classiﬁers
decisions are recorded as 0 or 1, where 1 indicates that the classiﬁer
believes that the image is spoofed. The ﬁnal spooﬁng score sf for one
test ﬁngerprint image is given as
sf ¼
Pm
i ¼ 1
Pn
j ¼ 1 D
i
j
mn
ð8Þ
where m is the number of base classiﬁers types, n is the number of
bootstrap replicates and Dji is the decision of base classiﬁer of type I
trained on the bootstrap replicate number j. In the proposed
implementation, m¼ 3;n¼ 100. The value of sf is in the range
½0;1. By setting and adjusting a threshold tA ½0;1, different
operating points of the anti-spooﬁng approach are conﬁgurable.
4. Experiments and discussion
In order to evaluate the suggested 1-median ﬁltering and bagging
approaches, a modularised setup is employed, using state-of-the-art
feature extraction, recognition and spooﬁng algorithms described in
the following sections. After an introduction into database, metrics
and employed reference setup, this section concentrates on questions
related to baseline performance of spooﬁng detectors evaluating the
bagging classiﬁer approach and inter-relation of recognition and anti-
spooﬁng. Then, partial multibiometric spooﬁng in multibiometric
face and ﬁngerprint context is assessed, considering recognition-only
and joint recognition and liveness fusion techniques.
4.1. Setup: database and metrics
As in many other approaches assessing face and ﬁngerprint
fusion [18,35], also this work builds on a chimeric dataset pairing
face and ﬁngerprints originally originating from different people.
This approach is justiﬁable, since ﬁngerprints and faces as biometric
modalities can be assumed to be independent. While also true
multi-biometric databases exist with multiple traits collected from
the same person, this does not extend to spooﬁng datasets. Further,
spooﬁng datasets are created for liveness detection purposes and
therefore usually do not have to come with a large number of
genuine samples, which are needed for the intended recognition-
based assessment. In contrast to spooﬁng evaluations assessing
ferrfake and ferrlive (see Section 2) measures, this evaluation refers
to Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC). Note that for m40
spoofed samples these refer to pairs of Spoof False Acceptance Rate
(SFAR) and Genuine Acceptance Rate (GAR, the percentage of
genuine users being accepted), rather than False Acceptance Rate
(FAR) and GAR pairs, see [36]. For comparing recognition perfor-
mance (S)EER is employed as the (Spoof) Equal Error Rate where
GAR¼(S)FAR and decidability index (d-Prime) as
d0 ¼ μ1μ2
 = ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃðσ21þσ22Þ=2
q
measuring the separation of distribu-
tions with mean μi and standard deviation σi.
Paired data originate from the following datasets (Table 1):
 LivDet 2013 CrossMatch [4]: The 4500 images of 99 users
support up to 3 genuine samples per ﬁnger and a varying
number of spoofed samples made from BodyDouble, Latex,
Playdoh and WoodGlue.
 Idiap ReplayAttack [37]: The counter-spooﬁng video database of
1300 clips of 50 clients with 320  240 pixels resolution
provides 8 genuine and 40 attack samples per user offering a
controlled (homogeneous background) and challenging adverse
recording setup. There are 4 mobile attacks using iPhones, 4
high-resolution iPad replays, and 2 hard-copy prints.
 CASIA AntispooﬁngFace [38]: This database of 600 clips of 50
clients with 640  480 pixels resolution comes with 3 genuine
and 9 fake samples per user, offering low, medium and high
quality setups and 3 fake attacks.
A chimeric dataset is compiled, combining faces and ﬁngers
from the databases above, forming a new set of 85 classes. Note
the number of classes, 85, is due to the restriction of LivDet to
right-hands only and guaranteeing a minimum number of genuine
and spoof ﬁngers to simulate the selection of n out of m spoofed
samples of different ﬁngers in a random way. Testing uses right
hands only to allow for a training of the employed counter-
spooﬁng detector and learning-based parameters of median ﬁlter-
ing. Spooﬁng attempts are simulated by randomly replacing m out
of n samples (4 ﬁngers and 1 face) with spoofs.
4.2. Setup: baseline system
For experiments, the following baseline system is employed:
 NIST Biometric Image Software [39]: For ﬁngerprint feature
extraction (using minutiae detection mindtct) and comparison
(using bozorth3 in 1:1 verify mode). While the ﬁnal score is not
normalised, (capped) min–max normalisation is used to map
scores to the unit interval ½0;1.
 Neurotechnology VeriLook 5.5 [40]: For processing video/still
image face samples. The off-the-shelf software extracts a 4–
35 kB template via facial reference points and is able to account
for off-axis registration (using 15 degrees roll, pitch and yaw
parameters). Note that quality assurance (ISO/IEC 19794-
5:2005) was deactivated to account for low-quality samples
in the dataset. The setup employed in this work used the low
matching speed setting with switched-off threshold (such that
ﬁnal scores could be obtained).
 LBP-TOP Face-Liveness [24]: Using the open-source implementa-
tion in [26] for face liveness-detection. The LBP-TOP operator
calculates LBP features at three orthogonal planes that intersect
Table 1
Employed test databases.
Mod. Database/set Images Users Training Testing
FP LivDet2013 Crossmatch 4500 99 Left hand Right hand
Face ReplayAttack 1300 50 train set devel, enroll, test
Face AntispooﬁngFace 600 50 – train, test
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in the centre pixel. The features are extracted from each separate
plane and then concatenated together. A multi-resolution
description is then generated such that the histograms along
the time domains (XT and YT) are concatenated for different
values of time t. Fig. 4 illustrates the process. Compared with
traditional 2D LBP features, LBP-TOP can capture spatio-
temporal features combining information from both image and
time domains. SVMs are then applied for classiﬁcation.
 Bagging Fingerprint-Liveness: As introduced in Section 3.
4.3. Baseline performance of spooﬁng detectors
In a ﬁrst experiment, the detection performance of employed
spooﬁng detectors is investigated. For anti-spooﬁng performance
assessment, ferrfake and ferrlive rates are computed, using the
underlying LivDet 2013 Crossmatch dataset for the ﬁngerprint
modality, and the ReplayAttack database for face. The implemen-
tation of the face spooﬁng-detection algorithm based on the open
source package provided from the original work [26] yielded an
accuracy of 85% on ReplayAttack. A similar accuracy is obtained for
the presented ﬁngerprint detection scheme, however the rate is
much more remarkable given the high quality of the underlying
spooﬁng dataset. Counter-spooﬁng using bagging classiﬁers
yielded an accuracy of 84% on the Crossmatch set (the method is
trained using a distinct subset of the test database using ﬁngers
from left hands), a value which signiﬁcantly outperforms the best
accuracy reported (68.8%) in the results of the LivDet liveness
detection competition [4] for this subset. Given that integrated
feature-level and classiﬁer fusion in spooﬁng detectors is not a
common practice, recognition rates are very promising and sug-
gest to explore this topic even further in the future.
4.4. On the mutual impact of liveness and recognition
Spooﬁng systems are usually evaluated on their own without
taking recognition into consideration [6]. However, the joint operation
of liveness and recognition systems in practice raises a series of
questions, most notably how to combine recognition and liveness
information. This section highlights that not only liveness values are
useful in justifying the authenticity of an identiﬁcation claim, but also
vice versa: the recognition score of a template is actually helpful to
judge the presence of a spooﬁng attack. In LivDet, counter-spooﬁng
performance is measured in terms of ferrfake and ferrlive rates
referring to ﬁnger images as inputs, not comparisons. If recognition
scores are to be considered in the evaluation of spooﬁng detection, it is
important not to assume speciﬁc properties of the comparison. In real-
world applications, however, a fake ﬁngerprint will be employed to
fake the originating identity causing its corresponding score to be
distributed according to the spoof-imposter score distribution,
whereas a live ﬁngerprint is to originate from either genuine or
zero-impostor distributions. The impostor score distribution is likely to
shift towards the genuine score distribution in evaluations considering
non-zero-effort impostors [6], whereas the genuine score distribution
remains unaffected. Since spoofs are unlikely to be perfect, scores are
typically degraded, which can be used to judge the presence of a fake
sample using, e.g. fuzzy logic as employed in [8]. Simple fuzzy-rule
based (inverting the recognition score contribution after threshold
t¼0.6) product fusion of recognition and liveness scores using
randomly determined identity claims in experiments increased the
spooﬁng detection capability from 18.36% ferrfake¼ ferrlive to 13.86%
for the LivDet CrossMatch set. The integration of spooﬁng scores into
recognition accuracy can further increase recognition accuracy when
considering 1-spoof impostors in evaluations, e.g. by simply rejecting
the sample [15]. Therefore, the real challenge is to ﬁnd a suitable
tradeoff between recognition accuracy and spooﬁng robustness, sub-
ject to investigation in the next sections.
4.5. Combining liveness and recognition scores with logistic
regression
With the positive impact of recognition on spooﬁng detection and
vice versa, it is reasonable to proceed towards a holistic framework
integrating both evidence as discussed in Sections 2 and 3 and
illustrated in Fig. 1. When combining both sets of scores individually
using sum rule, logistic regression can be used to learn a more robust
boundary. This boundary is trained (and then outliers eliminated
using the presented 1-median ﬁltering approach) in already com-
bined (fused) space, which is able to clearly distinguish between
different zero-effort and spoof detection. The 1-spoof and 2-spoof
examples are used to account for the median tolerating a number of
Fig. 4. LBP-TOP process [24]: for each of three planes intersecting at one pixel, LBP histograms are computed and concatenated.
Fig. 5. Fused liveness-comparison scores with trained decision boundary for
genuine, impostor, 1-spoof and 2-spoof pairs for ﬁnger-and-face fusion.
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outliers up to half of the samples. The trained decision hyperplane in
Fig. 5 has the following form:
Ψ : y¼ 13:52xþ12:4257: ð9Þ
The experiment also clearly illustrates how m-spoof distributions
are shifted towards the genuine distribution with increased m.
4.6. Classical fusion in partial multibiometric spooﬁng
In partial multibiometric spooﬁng,m out of n biometrics samples
of an identity are spoofed (n¼5 with 4 ﬁngerprints and 1 face in
experiments, using equal probabilities). That is, an attacker is
assumed to have access to m¼ 0;1;…;n latent ﬁngerprints or face
masks/print-outs for the attempt to spoof the system, referred to as
an m-spoof attack. Recognition rates for the common fusion rules
sum, product and median are evaluated in this scenario and results
listed in Table 3. Conﬁrming assumed behaviour, experiments in
this work show that spooﬁng clearly impacts on recognition. For
simple sum rule fusion it is evident that recognition is affected if
even a single sample is spoofed, EER is degraded from 0% to 2.32%
(d-Prime from 2.91 to 2.62). While perfect separation in the ﬁrst
case is certainly also attributable to the size of the dataset, the
degradation is clearly visible, taking also the large number of
5 combinations of 2 modalities in a single authentication attempt
in our particular setup into account. Furtherm-spooﬁng of faces and
ﬁngerprints suggest an increase of abs. 2–3% using sum rule for
every additional spoofed sample (EERs of 2.32–12.24% for 1–5
spoofs), which is even more pronounced compared to previous
ﬁngerprint-only experiments [10] and spooﬁng of all samples did
not always lead to acceptance (due to degraded accuracy of spoofed
samples). The ROCs in Figs. 6 and 7 illustrate the degradation for
sum and median rules, respectively.
In contrast to previous experiments on ﬁngerprints only,
median rule has shown to be even more successful in combining
results. There is little difference between 0-spoof, 1-spoof, and 2-
spoof samples (EERs of 0.42%, 0.87%, and 1.20%), suggesting better
tolerance vs. spooﬁng attempts clearly outperforming the sum-
rule. However, this comes at a price of clearly degraded initial
performance. Further, results indicated that the underlying dis-
tributions have a huge impact on the performance of the median
rule (reported results refer to min–max-normalised scores). It is
therefore important to consider learning distributions beforehand
and employ a proper normalisation method. If median rule is
extended to median ﬁltering, the low 0% EER of 0-spoofs can be
retained and still a better spooﬁng resistance than sum rule is
observed. The product rule performed slightly worse than sum
rule with 1–5 spoof EERs of 3.35–15.72%.
As an interesting side-aspect of the evaluation conducted in this
paper, the effect of face-only vs. ﬁngerprint-only spooﬁng is inves-
tigated. If always a speciﬁc modality is spoofed, a clear discrepancy of
spooﬁng success can be observed: for 1-spoof spooﬁng restricted to
spooﬁng the face image only (without spooﬁng detection) 7.33% EER
is obtained (using sum rule), whereas ﬁngerprint-only spooﬁng
results in 1.19% EER. This underlines the difﬁculty of ﬁnding suitable
counter-spooﬁng fusion methods being able to tackle these different
shifts in distributions. Note that however the quality of the employed
Fig. 6. ROC for partial multibiometric spooﬁng using sum rule.
Fig. 7. ROC for partial multibiometric spooﬁng using median rule.
Fig. 8. ROC for partial multibiometric spooﬁng using 1-median ﬁltering þ LR.
Table 2
Average mean vs. median of m-spoof imposter distribution.
Unit 0-spoof 1-spoof 2-spoof 3-spoof 4-spoof 5-spoof
Median 0.991 0.989 0.984 0.965 0.935 0.921
Mean 0.989 0.964 0.940 0.914 0.889 0.873
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face database was also very challenging and thus impacting on this
result. Experiments continue with the setup using random selection
of spooﬁng samples (i.e. 20% probability to spoof face and 420%
probability to spoof ﬁngerprint).
4.7. Median ﬁltering
In order to evaluate the suggested 1-median ﬁltering an experiment
using LR on the joint liveness-and-score pairs is conducted, incorporat-
ing liveness information into decision. Obtained EER for the method
show much more stable results and also ROC curves are much ﬂatter,
see Fig. 8 plotted using log-scale. Median-ﬁltering on probabilities of
already combined scores and liveness measures is able to retain EERs
below 2% over all spooﬁng attempts, within a narrow band (0.81–
1.81%), and at the same time retains a very high 0-spoof accuracy
(0.47%). Results refer to using a ﬁlter radius of ϕ¼ 3σ, i.e. relative to the
standard deviation of fused samples. Also corresponding d-Prime clearly
illustrate the much better separation of genuine and m-impostor
distribution. However, the tradeoff is a slightly degraded initial 0-
spoof performance of 0.47% (which however, is much better than
previously published results in [10] due to better spooﬁng detection).
In a further experiment we veriﬁed the superiority of the median
compared to the mean when looking at simple recognition-score m-
spoof imposter distributions. From Table 2 we can see that (1) mean
recognition scores decrease with the number of spoofed samples
indicating an effect of the spooﬁng effort; and (2) median conse-
quently delivered better performance suppressing the negative
impact of spoofed samples (note the small changes especially for
up to 2-spoof in contrast to the mean) conﬁrming theoretical
considerations. Finally, we also tested the effect on variance and
found that variance is increasing for a larger number of spoofed
samples in multibiometric conﬁguration (e.g., σ2 ¼ 0:00012 for
0-spoof, 0.0222 for 3-spoofed and 0.0293 for the 5-spoof case).
Finally, a critical task in setting up parameters for the median
ﬁltering is a suitable choice for the ﬁlter radius ϕ. The introduction of
ﬁlter parameter ϕ results in a tradeoff permitting for better choices
between the median rule (ϕ 0), which is better for suppression of
spooﬁng attempts, and the sum rule (ϕ¼1), which delivers the best
zero-spoof performance. While one method is to employ static values
of ϕ, in order to avoid over-ﬁtting with regards to the training set,
dynamic selection methods of ϕ are investigated, based on the
scattering of input scores (e.g., as a factor of σ being the standard
deviation of the n scores/tuples to be combined). As can be seen from
ﬁlter evaluations on score-only combinations in Table 3, small values of
ϕ (0.5) deliver a closer performance to median ﬁltering, whereas larger
values of ϕ are closer to the performance of the sum rule. This way an
arbitrary compromise between classical accuracy using the sum rule
and potentially slightly degraded 0-spoof performance but higher
spooﬁng resistance, as for the median rule, can be obtained. While
the paper does not aim to provide an assessment of computational cost,
note that the overhead introduced by median ﬁltering is minimal, as
the number n of employed features is typically a ﬁxed and low number.
4.8. Rejection of spooﬁng samples
Finally, the classical alternative in many implementations imple-
menting counter-spooﬁng functionality is to reject samples during
quality assurance, if they appear to originate from a spoofed source.
Unfortunately spooﬁng detector errors in multibiometric conﬁguration
add up and cause a high number of falsely rejected genuine attempts.
In order to virtually compare this method with the presented
integrated approach, the ﬁnal score is set to 1, if and only if one or
more of the spooﬁng scores were greater than a threshold (t¼0.44 is
used). The resulting (virtual, as normally this would result in a Failure
to Acquire error) EER of approx. 22% clearly illustrates the superiority
of integrated recognition-and-spooﬁng fusion. Further, especially for
commercial applications falsely rejected users are considered critical,
whereas any threshold is typically set at a very conservative level
which limits the use of employed techniques. Compared to techniques
integrating liveness results, an advantage is that no information is lost
and the overall scores can be taken into account.
5. Conclusion
Experiments in this paper show that 1-spooﬁng in face and
ﬁngerprint fusion can successfully be targeted by employing med-
ian instead of sum rule for combinations using its property to be
less affected by a certain number of outliers. However, this comes at
the cost of a reduced 0-spoof performance. Its extension to 1-
median ﬁltering is able to ﬁnd arbitrary trade-off points between
sum and median rule, allowing for better ﬂexibility in choosing the
right tradeoff between accuracy and security. The paper investi-
gated how spooﬁng detection and recognition can mutually beneﬁt
from each other and evaluated 1-median ﬁltering as a novel
multibiometric fusion method integrating liveness and recognition
scores. Results yielded more stable results for this method in partial
multibiometric spooﬁng conﬁguration, wherem out of n samples of
an identity are spoofed (EERs 0.47–1.81% vs. 0–12.24% for the sum
rule). The paper presented an analysis of the ﬁlter radius in median
ﬁltering and investigated the impact of face vs. ﬁngerprint spooﬁng.
Finally, bootstrap aggregating (bagging) classiﬁers were proposed
for anti-spooﬁng and shown to deliver highly accurate results (84%
accuracy) on the challenging LivDet2013 crossmatch dataset. We
believe the following remaining questions should be further inves-
tigated in future work: a closer investigation of score normalisation
issues for median ﬁltering; an extension towards user-adaptive
anti-spooﬁng and recognition fusion, and; integration of extrinsic
factors (e.g. acquisition conditions) and/or quality-related measure-
ments into the fusion scheme.
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Table 3
EER/SEER (in %) and d-Prime results of face-and-ﬁnger fusion on the test set varying the number m of spoofed samples.
Method (S)EER d-Prime
m¼0 m¼1 m¼2 m¼3 m¼4 m¼5 m¼0 m¼1 m¼2 m¼3 m¼4 m¼5
Sum rule 0 2.32 5.71 7.52 10.38 12.24 2.91 2.62 2.27 2.11 1.89 1.67
Product rule 0 3.35 7.61 9.48 12.64 15.72 6.44 3.40 2.31 2.03 1.69 1.42
Median rule 0.42 0.87 1.20 3.91 6.74 10.03 2.38 2.37 2.31 2.14 1.89 1.68
Median ﬁltering (ϕ¼ 1σ) 0 1.71 3.65 5.22 8.02 10.60 2.66 2.45 2.19 2.06 1.87 1.69
Median ﬁltering (ϕ¼ 0:5σ) 0 1.03 2.04 3.50 6.23 9.53 2.29 2.17 2.01 1.90 1.75 1.69
1-Median ﬁlter 0.47 0.81 1.16 1.39 1.71 1.81 3.18 3.16 3.12 3.11 3.10 3.08
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